The influence of democratic legitimacy on outcomes in governance networks by Klijn, E-H. (Erik-Hans) & Edelenbos, J. (Jurian)
The influence of democratic legitimacy on outcomes in governance 
networks 
 
Erik Hans Klijn 
Jurian Edelenbos 
 
Paper for the 11th conference of the Public Management Research Association (PMRA), 2-4 June 
2011, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse, USA 
 
Abstract 
The literature on (governance) networks and network management in general focuses on the performance of 
these networks or the way networks are constructed or decision-making or collaborative processes in these 
networks unfold.  Some authors assert that most of the new forms of governance networks have a distinct 
managerial bias (see, for instance, Pollitt‟s 2003 discussion of joint up government or Sullivan & Skelcher, 
2002).  This certainly is evident in the US literature, which, with some exception (see for instance: O Toole, 
1997), pays little attention to the democratic character of networks, or to the possible tensions between 
governance networks and the traditional institutions of representative democracy.    
As compared to the American literature, a greater level of attention is paid in the European literature to the 
tensions that exist between governance networks, institutions of representative democracy and the overarching 
need to involve stakeholders in decision making. There is however very little empirical work on the democratic 
nature of these networks although theoretical work on this is growing (Sorensen and Torfing, 2007). 
 
This paper elaborates on the notion of democratic legitimacy and develops a framework for analyzing this 
phenomenon in governance networks. The paper distinguishes three dimensions of democratic legitimacy 
drawing upon different theories of democracy. These are accountability (tied to more representational theories of 
democracies), voice (tied to more participative theories of democracies) and due deliberation (tied to more 
deliberate theories of democracies). The paper operationalizes each form of democratic legitimacy and then 
looks how these various forms of democratic legitimacy influence the outcomes in governance networks. We test 
this with a survey done in the first half of 2010 among respondents in environmental projects/water management 
projects (n=220). Regression analyses with various forms of outcomes (process or content outcomes) and the 
forms of democratic legitimacy as independent variables show that democratic legitimacy in general has a 
significant positive effect on outcomes in governance networks and that more deliberate dimensions of 
democratic legitimacy have much stronger impact than for instance representational dimensions of democratic 
legitimacy. The paper also shows a fairly strong correlation between network management strategies and 
democratic legitimacy. The paper ends with a reflection on the findings for theories of governance networks and 
network management. 
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 1. Introduction: democratic legitimacy in governance networks 
 
Governance and governance networks are popular words in modern public administration 
research and public administration practice. In many policy documents, certainly in Europe 
one can find the word governance and even the word networks and the call for new ways to 
organize public services or decision-making processes. But there is also a growing number of 
articles and books that have the performance of networks, their complex interactions or the 
way they are managed as subject of research. 
 
Network research in the USA and in Europe 
In that attention we can witness some significant differences between the US based literature 
on networks and governance and the literature that originates from Europe. Two differences 
are most striking and that is the way the concept network is conceptualized (and the focus of 
the research) and the second is the theme of democratic legitimacy. In the US the literature on 
networks is far more focused on service delivery and policy implementation as can be seen 
from the literature that deals with health care (Provan et al, 2009), education (Meier and 
O'Toole, 2007) or other sectors. And the concept network is used mostly (not always) for 
situations where various organizations are tightly knit together in organizing services. Not 
surprisingly we find also conceptualizations of structures of networks as centrally managed or 
not (Provan and Kenis, 2007). In the US literature the concept network is also strongly tied to 
social network analysis as research method (Provan et al, 2009) although also other methods 
are used.  
In the European literature networks are more used in relation to complex decision-making 
processes in infrastructure projects, policy sectors (like employment policy, health policy) etc 
(see Rhodes, 1997; Kickert et all, 1997; Koppenjan and Klijn, 2004; Sorensen and Torfing, 
2007). Networks are seen as more or less interdependent sets of actors that are involved in 
policy making and decision-making about complex policy problems. There is also a wide 
range of literature that focus on governance networks as more interactive form of policy and 
decision-making to include citizens and other stakeholders (see Edelenbos, 2005; Marcussen 
and Torfing, 2007). Thus while the literature on networks in the US concentrates on networks 
with a relative high density that are involved in the implementation of policy the European 
literature on networks concentrates more on loosely coupled networks in which policy is 
made and processed. In Europe the concept network is also strongly tied to the concept 
governance while this relation in the US is less clear (see Klijn, 2008). This probably has to 
do with the fact that, roughly speaking, the European literature is more strongly influenced by 
political science oriented research on policy networks while the US literature is more strongly 
influenced by the inter-organizational perspective on networks (see for a discussion about 
these different traditions of network research: Klijn 2008) 
It probably because of this difference in flavor of the US and European literature that the US 
literature has very little attention for the relationship of networks and democracies while this 
is a prominent subject in Europe (see Sorensen and Torfing, 2005; Klijn and Skelcher, 2007). 
The US literature has a strong occupation with efficiency (for an exception: O Toole, 1997). 
But the question how decision-making in governance networks are organized and how they 
meet democratic legitimacy is a very important question both in a normative sense as in an 
empirical sense. 
 
This paper: how does democratic legitimacy influences outcomes in governance processes 
This paper finds itself in the European tradition of networks. Not only because the authors are 
European but also because we look at complex decision-making processes rather than service 
implementation. The paper looks at how democratic legitimacy influences the outcomes 
achieved in governance networks. For that we first need to elaborate the concept democratic 
legitimacy and the forms it can take. Building on different democracy tradition we distinguish 
three forms of democratic legitimacy (accountability, voice and due deliberation) that comes 
from three different strands of literature on democracy (representational democracy. 
participation democracy and deliberate democracy). We then suggests various hypotheses 
about how these forms of democratic legitimacy might have influence on outcomes in 
governance networks (section 2). Section 3 deals with the methodology. To test our 
hypotheses we used material acquired by a web-based survey among respondents (220 
respondents) involved in environmental/spatial projects where water storages or water safety 
was an important part of the policy problem. We operationalized the three forms of 
democratic legitimacy with separate items and looked how they related to outcomes and the 
level of trust in the network. Section 4 presents the main outcomes while in section 5 we offer 
some conclusions and reflections. 
 
 
2.  Governance networks and democracy  
 
Governance networks can roughly be defined as “more or less stable patterns of social 
relations between mutual dependent actors, which form around policy program and/or cluster 
of means and which are formed, maintained and changed through series of games” 
(Koppenjan and Klijn, 2004, pp.69-70). Crucial to the emergence and existence of networks 
are dependency relations between actors (Hanf and Scharpf, 1978). The resource 
dependencies around policy problems or policy programs require actors to interact with one 
another and create more intensive and enduring interactions (Laumann and Knoke, 1987).  
Governance networks manifest themselves in concrete policy interactions, which we call 
policy games, between actors. During these games, the actors attempt to influence policy 
issues, but they also re-interpret the available information and informal and formal rules that 
were generated earlier. In short, governance networks can be characterized by a high degree 
of complexity and dynamics (Agranoff and McGuire, 2003; Koppenjan and Klijn, 2004). That 
complexity mainly stems from the number of involved actors, the many different places 
(arena's) where decisions are being taken, and the number of perceptions and especially value 
conflicts which stem from these. It is not easy to achieve good outcomes in such complex 
interactions. From earlier research we know that especially the level of trust (Klijn et al, 
2010b) and the number of employed network management strategies (Klijn et al 2010a also 
Meier and O'Toole, 2007; Provan et al, 2009) is very important to achieve good outcomes in 
networks. 
 
But it is also clear that governance networks show different patterns of decision-making and 
accountability than is presented in traditional decision-making in which political actors decide 
on goals and then these goals are implemented. If various societal actors are involved in the 
formulation of policy goals, as is the case in governance networks, the primary of politics is 
challenged in one way or another (Klijn and Skelcher, 2007). If one takes the position that 
decision-making should originate from elected officeholders to require democratic legitimacy 
there is certainly tension between representational democracy and networks. We can however 
'measure' democratic legitimacy of networks with different yardsticks. Only one of the 
measurements is the way in which elected bodies control the developments that take place 
within public private partnerships.  
 Forms of democratic legitimacy: accountability, voice and due deliberation 
Various writers have emphasized that very different models of democracy exists which also 
stress different core elements of democracy. MacPherson (1977) sees four different models of 
democracy, in the history of political philosophy, that stress different core elements of 
democracy: 
- the utopian model in which democracy is the will of the people expressed by them. 
Democracy is the best way to serve the common purpose (by means of participation of 
individuals in the government) and the best way to develop individuals. Rousseau with 
his general will of the people but also Jefferson are examples of this model 
- the protective model in which democracy is mainly understood as a protection of 
citizens of their governments. Important are institutional features to protect the 
freedom of individuals and their freedom against the state. Individual votes in this 
liberal model are an effective expression of the citizens' wishes. James Mill and 
Jeremy Bentham are the most well known examples of this second model;  
- developmental model, which stresses participation of citizens as both a good way to 
organize democracy but also as a way to develop citizens and actively enhance their 
freedom. John Start Mill is the most well known exponent of this model 
- competitive model in which democracy is a mechanism of decision-making where 
political leader compete to gain votes. One of the most prominent authors in this 
model is of course Schumpeter (1943) who criticized the classical model for holding 
unrealistic demands on participation and the way citizens are informed. His now 
famous definition of democracy is “That institutional arrangement for arriving at 
political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a 
competitive struggle for the people‟s vote (Schumpeter, 1943: 269)”. This idea of 
competition is taken further later on by the pluralists (Dahl, 1956, Truman, 1956) who 
see democracy as a plurality of groups struggling to power and Downs (1956) who 
presents the image of democracy as a marketplace where voters act rational and 
choose a political leader and a program, and parties and leader try to maximize votes. 
Legitimacy in this model is connected to the procedure that is followed (the voting) 
and the fact that political office holders are accountable and can be sent away in the 
next election. 
 
If we look at MacPherson‟s models we actually see two competing ideas, the idea that 
democracy is an arrangement to reach (efficient) decisions and protect individual freedom and 
the idea that democracy embodies normative ideas and rules about how we should organize 
our society. A society where people take part in decisions by active participation and develop 
themselves and the society by that. He calls the two competing models protective and 
developmental democracy, a thought that inspired many writers after him like Pateman (1970) 
and Held (2000).
i
  
If we look at more recent models of deliberative democracy (see Drysek, 2000; Hirst, 2000; 
Held, 2006) we see that these models add some characteristics especially the open debate 
among involved stakeholders about solutions (see also Fisher, 2003). The key to deliberative 
models of democracy is to quote Held: “the transformation of private preferences via a 
process of deliberation into positions that can withstand public scrutiny and test” (Held, 2006: 
237).  Essential to most forms of deliberative democracy is that preferences are not fixed, but 
can change in a debate. Or as Dryzek tells us: “The only condition for authentic deliberation is 
then the requirement that communication induce reflection upon preferences in non-coercive 
fashion (Dryzek, 2000: 2)”. But then for this deliberation to be successful another kind of core 
characteristic of democracy is introduced which could be described as openness or at least has 
to do with a number of rules and practices that all are connected to the process of discussion, 
information, plurality of values etc. Deliberative models of democracy stress that, besides the 
fact that officeholders are accountable and can be replaced (the core of the protective models 
of democracy) and that democracy is about participation in decisions being made (the core of 
the developmental models of democracy), democratic legitimacy can come from the 
characteristics of the process (openness, flow of information, etc) and is characterized by 
genuine deliberation and argumentation processes. This democracy is not about elected 
officeholders or by achieving as much voice as possible but about an argumentation process 
in which actors test arguments and achieve some sort of minimal consensus about solutions.  
 
Sources of democratic legitimacy  
If we look at various models of democracy and try to summarize their core and sources of 
legitimacy we could say that liberal and competitive models of democracy emphasize the 
accountability of elected officeholders to others. More idealistic models of democracy tend to 
emphasize the participation side of democracy: decisions are democratic if they have been 
achieved in processes of active citizens participation. Deliberative models of democracy add 
to this the importance of deliberation and the rules of open debate (see Dryzek, 2000). In a 
sense they are a radicalization of classical rules also emphasized by most models of 
democracy like fairness (see also Sorenson and Torfing, 2005). But they are on the other hand 
also more pragmatic (or at least part of the deliberative models are) in that they are more 
concerned in achieving practical outcomes that are relevant for the involved stakeholders 
(Dryzek, 2000; Held, 2006) 
 
In sum we could say that democratic legitimacy could come from three sources that of course 
are related, but which receive different emphasis of different models (see also Skelcher and 
Sullivan, 2008): 
- Accountability; In this first source the formal accountability of office holders (is it 
clear who is accountable) and the procedures to held them accountable (voting to get 
them in but even more important to get them out of position, and various rules that 
protect citizens) are stressed.  
- Voice; In this source of legitimacy it is not the passive influence that is important but 
the positive active way in which citizens can participate in concrete decisions and the 
processes in which they are achieved. In this source of legitimacy the way citizens are 
really involved is stressed.  
- Due deliberation; This source of democratic legitimacy is strongly connected to the 
way the interaction and deliberation process is organized. Democratic legitimacy in 
this view arises out of good deliberation process, guaranteed by clear and fair 
procedures and agreement between actors where they share knowledge and explore 
possible solutions and exchange value judgements.  
 
The relation between democratic legitimacy and governance networks: some assumptions 
Now the question is of course how the presence of certain democratic legitimacy in networks 
will affect the outcomes of these networks. We already noticed that governance networks 
involve often quite difficult decision-making with many actors. A high level of trust between 
actors in the governance network is also good for achieving outcomes as research by Klijn et 
al (Klijn et al, 2010b) shows.. 
But networks are also more horizontally coordinated policy structures because of the 
interdependencies between the actors. So to achieve good outcomes it is important that 
various actors that have resources or are necessary to achieve outcomes are involved in the 
decision-making process. 
So we may expect that democratic legitimacy in terms of voice and due deliberation that both 
stress that democratic legitimacy can originate from the involvement of stakeholders or from 
the deliberation process, have more positive influence than democratic legitimacy in terms of 
accountability. That would also match the observation of various authors that there is tension 
between representational democracy as a more vertical form of accountability and governance 
networks where we would witness more horizontal forms of accountability (see Klijn and 
Koppenjan, 2000; Edelenbos 2005; Sorensen and Torfing, 2005). On the other hand it is often 
stressed that te involvement of politicians is important in the way governance networks 
operate (Sorenson and Torfing, 2005; 2007), although recent research can not confirm this 
(Edelenbos and Klijn, 2006; Edelenbos et al, 2010). 
We may certainly expect voice end especially due deliberation to be positively correlated to 
trust in the network. We do not expect any positive relation between accountability and trust. 
This leads us to the following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Accountability is not related to network performance 
Hypothesis 2: Voice is positively related to network performance 
Hypothesis 3: Due deliberation is positively related to network performance 
Hypothesis 4. Accountability is not related to trust in networks. 
Hypothesis 5: Voice is positively related to trust in the networks. 
Hypothesis 6: Due deliberation is positively related to trust 
 
 
 
3. Research methods and data 
 
For this paper we use data from a web-based survey (Apr. – May 2010) among actors involved in 
complex water projects in the Netherlands. Besides water management, the projects did include other 
environmental functions, such as the building of houses and the development of recreational areas.  
 
Respondents and data 
An exhaustive list of people participating in such spatial projects does not exist. Nevertheless, we were 
able to obtain 874 e-mail addresses of people from our target group, by utilizing the mailing list of 
„Living with Water‟. This is a knowledge network where practitioners involved in this subject are part 
of, and that is directed at developing and the sharing knowledge about water management in various 
areas in the Netherlands. About 200 organizations collaborate in this program, including 
municipalities, water boards, building contractors and project management organizations. Our 
respondents thus represent the different organizational backgrounds actors have in networks around 
complex projects. At the same time, they represent the different positions people have within a water 
project: our respondents include managers, closely involved participants and even some bystanders. 
The respondents in our survey form therefore a good sample of the different actors involved in 
complex projects concerning water management in the Netherlands. A total of 272 questionnaires 
(31.1%) were returned. After conducting a missing value analysis, 221 respondents were included in 
the statistical analysis. 
 
The respondents of our survey have on average been involved in complex projects for twelve years. 
This shows that the respondents are quite experienced in dealing with network governance processes. 
However, the standard deviation is really high (8,50), which means that large differences exist in the 
number of years respondents have been involved in complex projects. The majority of our respondents 
(72,3 percent) are the most active actors in the project, including 35,2 percent who are managing the 
project and 38,0 percent who participates actively. The other quarter of our respondents consists of 
people who think along in certain parts of the project (18,5 percent) and bystanders (8,3 percent).  
 
Complexity of the projects 
The complexity of the projects and networks of actors around the project is shown in some of the 
descriptive statistics in table 1. On average about 3 planning activities are combined in the project. 
However, the standard deviation of 1,5 is quite high here, indicating that in some projects considerably 
more planning activities are combined than in others. In 92,1 percent of the project 5 or more actors 
are involved in the project; in 30,1 percent even 20 actors or more are participating. In the networks of 
participants around the projects, people experience a high degree of dependency on other actors. There 
are also some differences of opinion between the actors encountered in those networks. Furthermore, 
unexpected events occur regularly in the networks. Thus, we can indeed conclude that the projects 
respondents participated in and the networks around those projects are complex in nature.  
 
 
Table 1: Characteristics of the projects our respondents (N=221) participated in  
 
Number of different activities Mean = 2,84  
(sd: 1,5) 
Includes water storage, houses, 
business terrain, environmental 
development, commercial 
development, infrastructure (rail 
and public highways) 
   
Project includes: 
     Water storage  
      Construction of houses 
 
95,4 % 
52,1% 
 
   
Experienced dependency M = 3,95 
(sd: 0,90) 
5 point Likert scale 
   
Level of conflict M = 2,93 
(sd: 1,09) 
5 point Likert scale 
   
Unexpected events M = 3,37 
(sd: 0,91) 
5 point Likert scale 
 
 
In this paper we look at four crucial variables: the outcomes of governance networks, the level 
of democratic legitimacy as measured in three categories (accountability, voice and due 
deliberation) and the level of trust in the network.  
 
Network performance 
We measured network performance by 12 items that measure achieved outcomes. We build on earlier 
work we did in this field (see (Edelenbos et al, 2010; Klijn et al, 2010b). A distinction has been made 
between content outcomes (the innovative character of the project, cost efficiency, etc) and process 
outcomes (managerial effort, support of the stakeholders involved), a distinction also made by other 
governance network scholars (see, e.g. Skelcher et al., 2005). This distinction allows including 
traditional „hard‟ performance criteria in the analysis, as well as a wide variety of other performance 
criteria, including stakeholder involvement and democratic anchorage (Klijn and Skelcher, 2007; 
Sorensen and Torfing, 2007). The items related to democratic anchorage were explicitly aimed at 
outputs (thus compare the last item of the process items for instance) to distinguish them from the 
democratic legitimacy items which were aimed to measure involvement during the process. The items 
are presented in the table below (for more information see Klijn et al, 2010a) 
 
Table 2: Measurement of network performance 
Content outcomes Items 
1. innovative character Do you think that innovative ideas are developed during the project 
 
2. integral nature of solution Do you think that different environmental functions have been connected 
sufficiently? 
 
3. involvement of actors 
(content) 
Do you think that in general the involved actors have delivered a 
recognizable contribution to the development of the results? 
 
4. effectiveness solutions Do you think that the solutions that have been developed really deal with 
the problems at hand? 
 
5. effectiveness in the future Do you think that the developed solutions are durable solutions for the 
future? 
 
6. Relation costs and benefits 
 
Do you think that - in general - the benefits exceed the costs of the 
cooperation process? 
 
Process outcomes Items 
1.  level of management Do you think that the involved actors have contributed substantively to the 
management of the project? 
 
2. conflict resolution  Do you think that conflicts and differences of opinion have been solved 
adequately during the project?  
 
3. deadlocks Did you witness any disturbing deadlocks during the project? 
 
4.productive use of 
differences 
Do you think that the involved actors have made use of the existing 
different perspectives and insights (among the actors) in an adequate way 
with regard to solutions and problems in the project? 
 
5. contact frequency Do you think that the involved actors had frequently contact with each 
other during the project? 
 
6. support Do you think that the results from the project will get the support of the 
involved actors? 
 
 
For the variable outcomes used in our analysis we summated the 12 items and divided them by 12 to 
achieve a more general measurement of the network performance for each respondent on a Likert 
scale. The Cronbach‟s Alpha is 0,840. The mean of the scores for network performance is 3,64 (SD = 
0,47). 
 
Democratic legitimacy 
To measure the three different types of democratic legitimacy we developed two items for the 
accountability form (already tested in earlier research see Edelenbos et al, 2010) and three 
new ones for voice and due deliberation. The three items for voice are an indication of 
involvement of the stakeholders (the first two items) and the availability of information as 
condition for voice. The items for due deliberation are addressing transparency of the process, 
the possibilities for debate and the argumentation in the process. Table 3 provides the items, 
their Cronbachs, mean scores and standard deviation. Only the Cronbach of due deliberation 
is a bit low but given the low number of items still acceptable. 
 Table 3: items for democratic legitimacy 
accountability Cronbach: 0.81; , average: 3,56;  sd: 0.858 
1. Political institutions (city council, province council) are always good informed about 
process and progress of the project 
2. Political institutions (city council, province council) are actively involved in this project 
voice Cronbach: 0.71;  mean:  3,61;  sd: 0,516 
1. There are many different stakeholders involved in the project 
2. The process is well accessible for stakeholders 
3. The information about this projects is well organized 
Due deliberation Cronbach: 0.67;  mean: 3,76;  sd: 0,626 
1. The decision-making around this project is characterized by a large amount of 
transparency (insight in the decisions that have been taken) 
2. The process around this project did know many possibilities for debate and discussion 
3. About this project there was a careful and in terms of content good argumentation 
 
 
 
Trust between network actors 
To measure trust within the network, we used five dimensions derived from business literature (see 
Sako,1998; Nooteboom, 2002, Klijn et al., 2010b for more information on these dimensions). The five 
point Likert items are shown in Table 4 below. 
 
Table 4: Measurement of trust 
Dimension Item 
1. Agreement trust  
 
The parties in this project generally live up to the agreements 
made with each other 
2. Benefit of the doubt The parties in this project give one another the benefit of the 
doubt 
3. Reliability The parties in this project keep in mind the intentions of the 
other parties 
4. Absence of opportunistic behaviour Parties do not use the contributions of other actors for their 
own advantage 
5. Goodwill trust Parties in this project can assume that the intentions of the 
other parties are good in principle 
The mean score on trust is 3,53 (SD = 0,57) on a five point Likert scale, indicating a moderate degree 
of trust between the actors in the networks. The Cronbach‟s apha of the five items was 0,77. 
 
. 
 
Management strategies 
The use  of network management strategies is measured using 12 five point Likert items (totally 
disagree – totally agree). These items are a shortened version of a 16-item pilot scale we developed in 
previous research (see Klijn et al., 2010a for more information).  
 
Table 5: Measurement of management strategies 
1. The relevant public groups are involved via the organized forms of negotiation and discussion platforms   
2. The relevant private groups are involved via the organized forms of negotiation and discussion platforms   
3. The relevant civil action groups are involved via the organized forms of negotiation and discussion 
platforms  
 
4. In this project, it has been attempted as much as possible to make different opinions visible and included 
within the decision making 
 
5. In the collection of information, the emphasis in this project has been upon the development and 
establishment of common points of departure and information needs 
6. There is satisfactory attention in this project on involving external parties who can bring new ideas and 
solutions 
 
7. The project leaders consult those implementing the project and include them in their decisions. It can be 
said that decision making occurs collectively 
8. The project leaders in this project consider the relationships between parties and persons, what they are 
based upon, how they have developed and are developing  
9 By deadlocks and problems in the project, the management seeks to bring the opposing interests closer 
together. 
10.  In the project, explicit agreements are made about the organizational form of cooperation (project groups, 
steering groups etc.) 
 
11.  In the agreements on this project, room has been consciously built in for deviating from the plan, if this is 
of advantage.  
12. The withdrawal of parties from the project has been made possible to protect their interests if necessary.  
 
Every item is scored by the respondents on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). To 
construct the new variable „management strategies‟ we first dichotomize these items, by which the 
scores 1 till 3 received the new score of 0 and the scores 4 (agree) and 5 (strongly agree) received a 
score of 1. Subsequently, we summated the scores, resulting in a score per respondent on the number 
of management strategies which are used in the project. The Cronbach‟s Alpha of the scale was 0,817. 
 
 
 
 
Control variables 
As control variables we used size of the network (measured by a 5 scale category: less than 4 
actors, 5-9, 10-14, 15-19, 20 or more) and the issue complexity of the project which we 
operationalized as the number of different environmental functions  
 
 
Empirical results: the impact of forms of democratic legitimacy 
 
To analyze the relations between our main variables we first did a correlation analysis of all 
the variables included in our hypotheses. The results are shown in table 6.  
 
Table 6: Correlations between the main variables  
 
voice 
Due 
process 
Accoun 
tability 
Network 
performanc
e trust 
Network 
manage 
ment 
Voice Pearson 
Corre 
lation 
1 ,605** ,406** ,530** ,233** ,517** 
 (2-tailed)  ,000 ,000 ,000 ,001 ,000 
N 205 205 205 205 205 191 
Due 
deliberation 
Pearson 
Corre 
lation 
,605** 1 ,308** ,638** ,395** ,570** 
 (2-tailed) ,000  ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 
N 205 206 205 206 206 191 
Accoun 
tability 
Pearson 
Corre 
lation 
,406** ,308** 1 ,287** ,065 ,402** 
 (2-tailed) ,000 ,000  ,000 ,353 ,000 
N 205 205 206 206 206 191 
Network 
Perfor 
mance 
Pearson 
Corre 
lation 
,530** ,638** ,287** 1 ,589** ,547** 
 (2-tailed) ,000 ,000 ,000  ,000 ,000 
N 205 206 206 208 208 192 
trust Pearson 
Correlatio
n 
,233** ,395** ,065 ,589** 1 ,396** 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
,001 ,000 ,353 ,000 
 
,000 
N 205 206 206 208 212 196 
Number 
Network 
Management 
strategies 
Pearson 
Correlatio
n 
,517** ,570** ,402** ,547** ,396** 1 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 
 
N 191 191 191 192 196 197 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
The table shows that the main variables have a fairly strong and positive relation to each other. 
The three forms of democratic legitimacy show positive correlation but the relation between 
due deliberation and voice is much stronger, confirming our expectation. We see relation 
between trust and voice and due deliberation but not between trust and accountability which 
confirms our first hypothesis. Network performance is positively related to all three forms of 
democratic legitimacy in the table but the relation with accountability is clearly the least 
strongly. The number of network management is a strong variable that correlate with all the 
other variables and that confirms earlier research we did (Klijn et al, 2010a, 2010b). 
 
The impact of democratic legitimacy on outcomes 
The most important question is of course whether the three forms of democratic legitimacy 
make any differences for network performance. To test this more in depth we performed a 
regression analysis with network performance as dependent variable and the three forms of 
democratic legitimacy as independent variable. We included the two earlier mentioned control 
variables: size of the network and issue complexity. The results are presented in table 7. 
 
Table 7. Results with OLS regression with network performance as dependent variable (N= 196)a 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 1,814 ,162  11,173 ,000 
Voice ,059 ,017 ,249 3,525 ,001 
Due deliberation ,113 ,015 ,489 7,335 ,000 
accountability ,020 ,030 ,040 ,682 ,496 
Size of the network -,051 ,018 -,159 -2,863 ,005 
Issue complexity ,041 ,016 ,140 2,589 ,010 
a. Dependent Variable: network performance Predictors: (Constant), network size,  due deliberation, issue complexity, 
accountability, voice (adjusted  R square: 0.4).   
 
We see only significant relations between due deliberation and voice and network 
performance which confirms the first three hypotheses we made earlier. The relation of due 
deliberation with network performance is stronger that the relation of voice with network 
performance. We also see that the control variable size matters to performance. If the network 
is larger there is a lower performance (but the B is much lower than that of voice and due 
deliberation). 
We also performed the same regression with the content items only to look if the inclusion of 
some of the democratic anchorage items in the process items biased the analysis. But when 
we look at that regression we find a similar pattern: accountability is not significant (0.745) 
while voice (0.032) and due process (0.000) are significant (explained variance: 0.377).  
 
Democratic legitimacy and trust: the strength of due deliberation 
We also want to know what the impact is of the various forms of democratic legitimacy on the 
level of trust in the network. We saw that in the correlation table 6 that due deliberation and 
voice were significant but the regression analysis shows that only due deliberation is 
significantly related to trust. The overall explained variance of this model (0.13) is not very 
high and much lower than the previous regression with network performance as dependent 
variable. This means we can accept hypothesis 4 and 6 but have to reject hypothesis 5 (voice 
has positive impact on trust). Thus trust does not seem to be improved by including more 
stakeholders but is enhanced by good argumentation processes and transparency. Since voice 
does have significant impact on network performance we can conclude that this influence 
goes directly to performance and does not have an indirect effect on performance by means of 
enhancing trust. This is probably the explanation why due deliberation does have a greater 
impact on performance since contrary to voice is does have this indirect effect on network 
performance via trust. 
 
Table 8 results of OLS regression analysis with trust as dependent variable (N=196)a 
Mdel 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 2,299 ,272  8,450 ,000 
voice ,005 ,028 ,016 ,183 ,855 
Due deliberation ,121 ,026 ,397 4,696 ,000 
accountability -,043 ,050 -,063 -,854 ,394 
Size of network -,003 ,030 -,008 -,118 ,906 
Issue complexity ,006 ,026 ,014 ,209 ,835 
a. Dependent Variable: trust (adjusted R square: 0.13) 
 
And network management 
If we look at the impact of network management we see that each of the forms of democratic 
legitimacy is positively influenced by our variable number of strategies which measures the 
variety of network management strategies employed (see regressions in appendix). This 
means that empirically speaking democratic legitimacy in every way as measured as political 
involvement, as stakeholder involvement and as good deliberation process is fostered and 
improved by good network management. This is interesting because there are several authors 
that complain that there is too much attention for efficiency and management in the network 
literature (see Skelcher et al, 2005). Now this may be true, and certainly hold to an important 
extent for the US literature on networks, but our findings seem to point that intensive and 
varied network management is also good for democratic legitimacy. We come back to this 
point in the conclusion. 
 
 
6. Conclusions and reflections 
 
Governance networks should be effective (and efficient) to solve the problems where they are 
constructed for or where they emerge around. But it is also important that they show 
democratic legitimacy. We distinguished various forms of democratic legitimacy. We made a 
distinction  between accountability, which stresses the involvement of political elected bodies 
in governance processes in networks, voice, that stress the involvement of various 
stakeholders and due deliberation, that stresses the quality of the argumentation process. We 
assumed that the two last forms would have more beneficial effects on network performance 
than accountability and this turned out to be the case.  
 
Our analysis, based on a web based survey among people involved in complex governance 
process in environmental projects, shows that indeed accountability has no significant effect 
on network performance while both voice and due process do have a significant effect. Due 
process however shows a stronger relation with network performance. This is p[robably 
because it is more closely related to the negotiated character of governance networks. 
 
Only due deliberation had significant impact on trust. This confirms earlier research we did 
that trust and stakeholder involvement seem to be two separate characteristics of governance 
processes in networks that have separate influence on network performance but are not related 
to each other. Thus one can involve more stakeholders and thus enhance the voice dimension 
of democratic legitimacy but trust as facilitating factor for network performance still have to 
be achieved. 
And that has to be achieved by active and intensive network management which also 
enhances all the three forms of democratic legitimacy. As we already observed this seems to 
point that the contradiction that is made between some of the literature between managerial 
orientation of the one hand and democratic orientation on the other hand does not exists. But 
we should probably be a bit careful with this conclusion. This research is done in Europe, to 
be more precisely in The Netherlands where a consensual political and administrative culture 
exists in which it is fairly 'normal' to bargain and thus management and politics are maybe 
more strongly connected. And the research is done in a field, environmental decision-making, 
which are typically decision-making processes about difficult value problems and involve 
value conflicts between actors. Thus managerial actions also is aimed at achieving interesting 
solutions for the involved actors and bringing actors together. In that situation is is not 
surprising that managerial actions contribute to the democratic legitimacy forms as due 
deliberation and voice.  
It may be that in networks which are more aimed at solely implementing public services that 
are tendered in an earlier phase, as is the case in many US networks, the managerial 
orientation is much stronger than the democratic orientation. This really requires more 
international comparative research with the same theoretical framework and empirical 
instruments. And that is something public administration scholars should certaiunly be 
working on the next decade. 
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Appendix 
 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 7,931 ,413  19,204 ,000 
Size of the network ,313 ,081 ,239 3,843 ,000 
Issue complexity -,017 ,075 -,014 -,230 ,818 
Number of network 
management strategies 
,313 ,039 ,493 8,049 ,000 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 7,931 ,413  19,204 ,000 
Size of the network ,313 ,081 ,239 3,843 ,000 
Issue complexity -,017 ,075 -,014 -,230 ,818 
Number of network 
management strategies 
,313 ,039 ,493 8,049 ,000 
a. Dependent Variable: voicenew 
 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 7,853 ,428  18,353 ,000 
Size of the network ,111 ,084 ,082 1,313 ,191 
Issue complexity -,069 ,078 -,054 -,883 ,378 
Number of network 
management strategies 
,371 ,040 ,563 9,213 ,000 
a. Dependent Variable: dueprocess 
 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 2,279 ,216  10,528 ,000 
Size of the network ,053 ,043 ,086 1,253 ,212 
Issue complexity ,070 ,039 ,121 1,787 ,076 
Number of network 
management strategies 
,118 ,020 ,391 5,811 ,000 
a. Dependent Variable: accountability 
 
 
 
                                           
i
 Held tells that his models are inspired by the work of MacPhersen and he also uses the words protective and 
developmental democracy although he uses the ideas in a different way (see Held, 2006: 6) 
